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ARTICLE
Justice Douglas S. Lang I Haleigh Jones

Can Courts Require Civil Conduct?'
Abstract. There is considerable controversy on the question of whether
courts can require civil conduct by lawyers, not just in Texas but across the
country. To answer that question, it must be determined whether lawyer
civility is at least impliedly part of the court and disciplinary rules or whether
"civility" is only part of the professionalism creeds and merely "aspirational."
This Article attempts to answer this by discussing three viewpoints on
enforcing civility. Further, it argues for honest recognition of the multitude of
concerns about incivility and asserts that the legal profession must cultivate an
increase in the spirit of civility and professionalism.
Authors. Justice Lang is a member of the 5th District Court of Appeals,
a member and Secretary of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct, a
Trustee and member of the Executive Committee of the American Inns of
Court Foundation, a past president of the Dallas Bar Association and the
National Conference of Bar Presidents, and past chair of the Texas Center for
Legal Ethics and Professionalism.
Haleigh Jones, University of Cincinnati, Bachelor of Arts in Spanish and
Political Science, summa cum laude, 2012; Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law, Juris Doctor, magna cum laude, 2015. Jones is a
Briefing Attorney to the Honorable Justice Douglas Lang and a member of
the Dallas Bar Association and its Professionalism Committee.

1. This Article first appeared in the Texas Bar Journal and has been substantially expanded for
this publication. Douglas S. Lang, Can Court Require Ci Conduck, 78 TEX. B.J. 718 (2015).

222

ARTICLE CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

Introduction ...................................

223

224
What is Civility? ...........................
228
Three Diverse Viewpoints.......................
Is There an Incivility Problem? ................... 230
232
Can Civility Be Enforced? .......................
A. The DondiDecision..........................
232
B. Other Federal Courts........................ 234
C. Texas State Courts...........................238
241
V I. Conclusion ....................................
I.

INTRODUCTION

Can Texas Courts require civil conduct by lawyers? To answer that
question, we must decide whether lawyer civility is at least impliedly part of
the court and disciplinary rules or whether "civility" is only part of the
professionalism creeds and merely "aspirational." 2
There is considerable controversy on this topic, not just in Texas but
across the country. This Article attempts to answer the question raised in
the title by discussing three viewpoints on enforcing civility. Also, this
Article argues for honest recognition of the multitude of concerns about
incivility and asserts that the legal profession must cultivate an increase in
the spirit of civility and professionalism.

2. THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM (1989), reprinted in
TEXAS RULES OF COURT: VOLUME 1-STATE 869-71 (West 2014) (referring expressly to civility

and "civil" conduct and stating the "rules" contained in the Creed are "primarily aspirational"). See
generally Alicia Grant, Comment, The Texas Lanyer's Creed: Exploring Its Ongin and Irpact over the Last
Quarter Century, 6 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 120 (2016) (chronicling the history of the
Texas Lawyer's Creed).
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WHAT IS CIVILITY?

To engage in a constructive discussion of any viewpoint about lawyers'
civility, the term civility must first be defined. One way to define civility is
to distinguish it from "professionalism." The Conference of Chief Justices
suggests civility is a component of the concept of professionalism and
states the following:
Professionalism is a much broader concept than legal ethicsprofessionalism includes not only civiliy among members of the bench and
bar, but also competency, integrity, respect for the rule of law, participation
in pro bono and community service[] and conduct by members of the legal
profession that exceeds the minimum ethical requirements. Ethics are what
a lawyer must obey. Principles of professionalism are what a lawyer should
live by in conducting his or her affairs. 3
In contrast to the distinction made by the Conference of Chief Justices,
some commentators, like Donald E. Campbell, contend civility is distinct
from professionalism and difficult to define.' Campbell suggests that
civility is sometimes described as a set of core values based upon common
sense or manners.' He cites the famous statement by Justice Potter
Stewart about pornography, "[I] know it when I see it,"' and examples of
the Eleventh Circuit's description of bad faith actions of counsel.' For
example, in Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co.,' the Eleventh Circuit stated
that an attorney demonstrates bad faith sufficient to justify a court's
imposition of sanctions under its inherent power "by delaying or
disrupting the litigation or hampering enforcement of a court order."'
The court found the attorneys filed documents in bad faith when they
inserted "patently offensive remarks in the five documents . . . for the
purpose of deliberately provoking unnecessary personal animosity and

3. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER CONDUCT
AND PROFESSIONALISM 2 (1999), http://ccj.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/
Web%20Documents/National-Action-Plan-Full.ashx.
4. Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Rigbt Hand and Swear to Be Cii Defining CiiliRy as an

Obligaionof ProfessionalResponsibikoy, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 146 (2011).
5. Id. at 142.
6. Id. at 141-42 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart,

J.,

concurring))

(raising concerns about lack of "specificity" of some of the concepts of civility); see also Robert N.

Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why HardballTactics Don't Work, 74 A.B.A.

J., Mar.

1988, at 79, 79 ("Call it the

Rambo Reflex or 'hardball' lawyering-like pornography, you know it when you see it.").

7. Campbell, supra note 4, at 142 (citing Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306,
1320-21 (11th Cir. 2002)).
8. Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2002).
9. Id at 1320 (quoting Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d. 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 2002)).
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conflict between opposing counsel and for the purpose of creating an
unjustified and false impression that the opposing legal positions of the
parties were the result of racism on the part of [opposing] counsel."'"
Campbell's central complaint is that motley concepts of civility abound.
From his analysis of the civility codes of thirty-two jurisdictions, he
"distilled ten core concepts of civility."" Those concepts are:
1.

Recognize the importance of keeping commitments and of seeking
agreement and accommodation with regarding to scheduling and
extensions;
2. Be respectful and act in a courteous, cordial, and civil manner;
3. The obligation to be prompt, punctual, and prepared;
4. Maintain honesty and personal integrity;
5. Proper interactions with opposing counsel;
6. Avoid actions taken merely to delay or harass;
7. Ensure proper conduct before the court;
8. Act with dignity and cooperation in pre-trial proceedings;
9. Act as a role model to client and public and as a mentor to young
lawyers; and
10. Utilize the court system in an efficient and fair manner.' 2
According to Campbell, most of those ten concepts lack the necessary
"specificity" to be enforceable." He argues "there are enough vague
provisions that the unwary lawyer can find herself at the mercy of an
idiosyncratic judge's view of civility."" He suggests the following three
solutions to the "specificity" problem: (1) the courts could develop a
common law, case-by-case definition of civility;`s (2) the codes could be
drafted with more specific terms; and (3) the state bars could issue ethics
opinions guiding the bar on specific civility issues.'" Campbell's concerns
10. Id. at 1322.
11. Campbell, supranote 4, at 146.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 145.
14. Id. at 146.
15. See id. at 145 ("First, courts can essentially develop a common law of civility by setting out,
on a case-by-case basis, a definition of what is 'civil'."). Courts are already beginning to define
"civility." See, e.g., Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, 70 F. Supp. 2d 415, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[qivility
refers to 'more than surface politeness; it is an approach that seeks to diminish rancor, to reconcile,
to be open to non[-]litigous resolution."' (internal quotation omitted)). Additionally, even courts that
do not define the term have discussed types of conduct that are uncivil. See, e.g., Gleason v. Isbell,
145 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[L]itigants should
avoid the use of inappropriate language and inflammatory rhetoric. Restraint, tolerance, and selfcontrol tend to foster civility. Name-calling, stridency, and rudeness have the opposite effect.").
16. Campbell, supra note 4, at 146.
See Voluntary Standards for Civility, D.C. BAR,
http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/voluntary-standards-for-civility/lawyers.cfm
(last
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lend some support to at least one concern expressed by commentators,
that using what some call the ambiguous and vague term civility to
sanction lawyers could deny due process."
However, Campbell's complex solutions are not the only way to find a
serviceable meaning for "civility." One less complex method is to simply
accept the common sense, plain meaning of civility identified by Justice
Anthony Kennedy of the U.S. Supreme Court: civility is simply, "respect."
Justice Kennedy explained, "[Civility] is not some bumper-sticker slogan,
'Have you hugged your adversary today?' Civility is the mark of an
accomplished and superb professional, but it is even more than this. It is
an end in itself. Civility has deep roots in the idea of respect for the
individual." 1 8
Another method to "specify" the meaning of civility is to use the time
honored method for interpretation of an undefined statutory term by
considering its plain meaning. The plain meaning of terms is routinely
found by courts in dictionary definitions.1 9 In this case, Merriam-Webster
Dictionary provides an uncomplicated, helpful definition of civility as
follows, "polite, reasonable, and respectful." 2 0
If the common sense or plain-meaning approaches are not sufficient for
the observer to understand "civility," consider the context in which the
Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted
the Texas Lawyer's Creed.2 1 In their November 7, 1989 order adopting

visited May 5, 2016) (indicating the principles lawyers should apply in and out of the courtroom); see
also STATE BAR OF CAL., ATTORNEY GUIDELINES OF CIVILITY AND PROFESSIONALISM 6 (2009),
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/9/documents/Civility/Atty-Civility-Guide-RevisedSept2014.pdf (indicating ethics opinions by the courts are already in place to "delineate the standard of
conduct for lawyers").
17. Cf Amy R. Mashburn, Making Ciility Democratic, 47 Hous. L. REV. 1147, 1221-22 (2011)
("Existing codes use words like 'civility,' 'disrespect,' and 'discourteous,' which experience suggests
cannot be given a sufficiently narrow meaning in a pluralistic society.... The intent of the offender
matters and perceptions of rudeness and disrespect are very subjective and contingent. However,
assessing the mental state of lawyers at the time they misbehave is prohibitively difficult and
worrisome. A psychological approach may produce an unpopular, de facto presumption against
sanctioning attorneys for their rude outbursts, but it also avoids unnecessary intrusions into First
Amendment rights and allays concerns about the due process implications of judges sitting in
judgment of lawyers who are accused of insulting them.").
18. Louis H. Pollak, ProfessionalAttitude, 84 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1988, at 66, 66 (quoting justice
Anthony Kennedy's address to the 1997 ABA Annual Meeting on Aug. 5, 1997).
19. See, e.g., Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437-38 (Tex. 2009)
(applying Black's Law Dictionary's definition of "undertake").
20. Citiky, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
civility (last visited May 5, 2016).
21. See generally Grant, supra note 2, at 120 (discussing adoption of the Creed).
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the Creed, the courts identified the need for the Creed stating that
"abusive tactics" in the practice of law must be eliminated.2 2 The courts
explained, "The abusive tactics range from lack of civility to outright
hostility and obstructionism. Such behavior does not serve justice but
tends to delay and often deny justice. The lawyers who use abusive tactics
instead of being part of the solution have become part of the problem."2 3
This statement regarding the Texas Lawyer's Creed expresses the
concern stated succinctly by the legal maxim "Justice delayed is justice
denied" that has appeared often in case law.2
While judges have the
inherit authority to control their dockets, lawyers also play a critical role in
facilitating effective judicial process. Recognizing this role, the preamble
to the Texas Disciplinary Rules states:
A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system,
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice. Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the
preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an
understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and function in
our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain
the highest standards of ethical conduct. 25

Further, although not defining the term civility, the Texas Lawyers
Creed cites the terms "civil" or civility three times when directing how

22. THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 2.
23. Id.

24. See People v. Ladd, 691 N.E.2d 896, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1998) (emphasizing the
importance of a speedy process in securing "the orderly administration of justice."); see also Daewoo

Int'l v. Monteiro, 2014 IL App (1st) 140573, ¶ 90 (emphasizing the importance of a timely notice of
appeal); People v. Wasilewski, 383 N.E.2d 31, 33-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1978) (addressing the
threats to justice posed by appeals filed for the purpose of delay); Gray v. Gray, 128 N.E.2d 602, 606
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1955) ("The law's delay in many lands and throughout history has been the
theme of tragedy and comedy. Hamlet summarized the seven burdens of man and put the law's
delay fifth on his list. If the meter of his verse had permitted, he would perhaps have put it first.
Dickens memorialized it in Bleak House[;] Chekhov, the Russian, and Moliere, the Frenchman, have
written tragedies based on it. Gilbert and Sullivan have satirized it in song. Thus it is no new
problem for the profession, although we doubt that it has ever assumed the proportions which now
confront us. 'Justice delayed is justice denied,' and regardless of the antiquity of the problem and the
difficulties it presents, the courts and the bar must do everything possible to solve it. We cannot
entertain the indifference to it which some members of the trial bar have.").
25. TEx. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 1 1, reprintedin TEx. Gov CODE

ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2013) (TEX. STATE BAR. R. art. X,

§ 9).

The Michigan Rules of

Professional Conduct's preamble contains a similar provision, stating: "A lawyer should demonstrate
respect for the legal system and for those that serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public
officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is
also the lawyer's duty to uphold legal process." MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.0.
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lawyers should conduct themselves in relationships with lawyers, 2 6
clients,2 7 the court, and court staff.28 This common sense and plain
meaning of "civility," derived from the Texas Lawyer's Creed, lays the
foundation for courts to utilize the concept of civility and professionalism
to address lawyer conduct.
III.

THREE DIVERSE VIEWPOINTS

Generally, there are three viewpoints. Some contend aspirational goals
requiring civility should be expressly incorporated into provisions of bar
disciplinary rules and court rules. For example, Professor David Grenardo
argues:
[C]ivility should be mandatory, i.e., compulsory, obligatory, required. In
other words, if an attorney fails to act with civility, then he/she can be
sanctioned or penalized. Each alleged violation of civility would be judged
on a case-by-case basis. Thus, as with alleged violations of the rules of
professional conduct, there might be no punishment in a particular case, or
the sanction could fall somewhere within a whole range of punishment.2 9
The courts in South Carolina have adopted this viewpoint and have
disciplined lawyers for incivility. For example, when an attorney sent his
opposing counsel an email accusing opposing counsel's daughter of
dealing drugs, the Supreme Court of South Carolina disciplined him for
conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice" and for violating the
lawyer's oath that includes civility.3 0

26. "I will be courteous, ddil, and prompt in oral and written communications." THE TEXAS
LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 2, 1 III (1) (emphasis added).
27. "I will advise my client that diliy and courtesy are expected and are not a sign of
weakness." Id. (emphasis added).
28. "[L]awyer to lawyer," "I will be courteous, dil, and prompt in oral and written
communications." Id. (emphasis added). To counsel, parties, the court, and court staff, "I will treat
counsel, opposing parties, the Court, and members of the Court staff with courtesy and diihy." Id.

(emphasis added).
29. David A. Grenardo, Making Cizdly Mandatory: Moin from Arpiredto Requird, 11 CARDOZO

PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICSJ. 239, 261 (2013); see also David A. Grenardo, An Uprising of Cid@ in Texas,
5 HLRE 1, 8 (2014) ("The [Texas Lawyer's] Creed is meant to be aspirational, but it can be enforced
by the courts through their inherent powers and rules already in existence, such as discovery rules.").

30. In re Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 709 S.E.2d 633, 636-38 (S.C. 2011).

The

following is an email for which the attorney was sanctioned:
I have a client who is a drug dealer on ... Street down town [sic]. He informed me that your
daughter, [redacted] was detained for buying cocaine and heroine [sic]. She is, or was, a
teenager, right? This happened at night in a known high crime/drug area, where [also] . . . many
shootings take place. Lucky for her and the two other teens, they weren't charged. Does this
make you and [redacted] bad parents? This incident is far worse than the allegations your client

2016]
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A second group argues that specific rules regulating incivility are
unnecessary and unworkable." 1 While there is consensus among those in
this second group that civility codes are inappropriate, the reasons for this
position and the alternative solutions that each scholar offers vary
significantly. Some members of this group argue reports of uncivil
behavior are exaggerated." Others assert that if civility were a part of any
mandatory standard for lawyer conduct, it would be fatally ambiguous,
would violate the First Amendment," and would deny due process."
is making. I just thought it was ironic. You claim that this case is so serious and complicated.
There is nothing more complicated and serious than having a child grow up in a high[-]class
white family with parents who are highly educated and financially successful and their child
turning out buying drugs from a crack head at night on or near ... Street. Think about it. Am I
right?
Id. at 636 (alterations in original).
31. See Amy R. Mashburn, Professionaksm as Class Ideology: Cidkly Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL.
U. L. REv. 657, 663 (1994) ("Exploring the manner in which civility codes arguably give form and
content to the partisan views of the bar's powerful elite is illuminating in other respects as well. It
reveals that these codes implicate a number of fundamental problems."); Brenda Smith, Comment,
Cviity Codes: The Newest Weapons in the "Civl" War over ProperAttorney Conduct Regulations Miss Their
Mark, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 151, 152-53 (1998) (claiming the goal which the "leaders of the civility
movement" wish to obtain would be more successfully achieved by other means than having the
courts adopt civility codes).
32. Mashburn, supra note 31, at 664-65 ("Mhe perceived decline in professionalism among
lawyers today might be an exaggerated, if not contrived, crisis."); see also Katherine Sylvester, I'm
Rubber, You're Sued: Should Uncivl Lanyers Receive Ethical Sanctions?, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1015,
1021 (2013) ("It is not settled that civility has actually declined in the legal profession."). But see Craig
Enoch, Incivi6ty in the Legal System? Maybe It's the Rules, 47 SMU L. REV. 199, 202 (1994) (discussing
the existence of incivility in the practice of law as of the article's date in 1994, suggesting incivility,
i.e., "sharp" practices (also referring to them as "Rambo" tactics) in the law, are no more prevalent
than in the past, "there are just more lawyers"); Mashburn, supra note 17, at 1148 (acknowledging the
rise of uncivil conduct and stating: "Not only do we notice impolite acts by individuals in the public
eye, but a perceived overall coarsening of manners and pervasive incivility have become familiar
subjects of commentary.").
33. See Smith, supra note 31, at 173 ("Many of the civility codes, whether general or specific,
employ vague and aspirational words such as integrity, civility, and courtesy, which have been
criticized as being 'highly contingent, contextual and indeterminate' words. Such words can be
subject to many different interpretations and definitions and cover a broad range of behavior. If
such broad words would lead a person to question exactly what kind of behavior is prohibited, the
civility codes could be found unconstitutionally vague."); see also In re Anonymous Member of the S.C Bar,
709 S.E.2d at 636-38 (disagreeing with respondent's argument that the civility clause contained
"within the lawyer's oath is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad"); Mashburn, supra note 17, at
1221-22 ("Existing codes use words like 'civility,' 'disrespect,' and 'discourteous,' which experience
suggests cannot be given a sufficiently narrow meaning in a pluralistic society.... The intent of the
offender matters and perceptions of rudeness and disrespect are very subjective and contingent.
However, assessing the mental state of lawyers at the time they misbehave is prohibitively difficult
and worrisome. A psychological approach may produce an unpopular, de facto presumption against
sanctioning attorneys for their rude outbursts, but it also avoids unnecessary intrusions into First
Amendment rights and allays concerns about the due process implications of judges sitting in
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Some in this group suggest alternatives to civility codes. Proposed
solutions include "more stringent enforcement of existing disciplinary
rules; preventative methods designed to educate, train and promote
collegiality; the use of more general-aspirational creeds by non-mandatory
bar associations; higher standards within the currently enforceable
disciplinary rules" 3 5 and client-centered solutions that allow "uncivil
lawyers to be separated in the market from civil ones, so clients may have
the choice of what type of lawyer they employ." 3 6
A third group argues that the obligation of lawyers to act in a civil
manner-as described in lawyer creeds-is at least implied in court, and
disciplinary rules and incivility can be addressed by enforcing statutes and
rules that empower courts to protect their jurisdiction. This approach was
adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas, which stated, "Compliance with
the rules [of the Creed] depends primarily upon understanding and
voluntary compliance, secondarily upon re-enforcement by peer pressure
and public opinion, and finally when necessary by enforcement by the
courts through their inherent powers and rules already in existence."

IV.

Is THERE

AN INCIVILITY PROBLEM?

In contrast with the position of some observers3 8 are the results of the
Supreme Court of Illinois Commission on Professionalism's 2009 survey.
In that survey, 4,450 attorneys in Illinois were polled regarding their
perceptions of civility in the legal profession.' "More than 85 percent of
respondents reported experiencing at least one instance of uncivil or
unprofessional behavior within the past six months, with sarcastic or
judgment of lawyers who are accused of insulting them.').
34. Mashburn, supra note 17, at 1222 (stating that there are "concerns about the due process
implications of judges sitting in judgment of lawyers who are accused of insulting them").
35. Smith, supra note 31, at 185.
36. Sylvester, supra note 32, at 1028.
37. THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 2; see also

PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 276-77 (Tex. 2012) (holding the Texas Lawyer's Creed is
only enforceable through the courts' inherent powers or by preexisting rules).
38. Mashburn, supra note 31, at 664-65 ("The Report's observation that 'one might think these
words were written today,' is both ironic and telling. The irony is that the ABA's Commission on
Professionalism ignored the obvious inference that the perceived decline in professionalism among
lawyers today might be an exaggerated, if not contrived, crisis."); Sylvester, supra note 32, at 1021
(conveying one observer's viewpoint that "[i]t is not settled that civility has actually declined in the
legal profession"); cf Enoch, supra note 32, at 202 (suggesting the seeming pervasiveness of "sharp"
practice in the legal profession only appears to have increased because there are more lawyers).
39. LEOJ. SHAPIRO & Assocs. LLC & ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM,
SURVEY
ON
PROFESSIONALISM:
A
STUDY
OF
ILLINOIS
LAWYERS
4
(2007),

http://www.2civility.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/surveyonprofessionalism_final.pdf.
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condescending attitudes, misrepresenting or stretching the facts, or
negotiating in bad faith as the most reported unprofessional behavior." 4 o
In relating these experiences, respondents identified three broad types
of unprofessional behavior: "prejudice, 1 rudeness,4 2 and strategic
Strategic incivility was the most frequently experienced
incivility." 4
unprofessional behavior.' A summation of the survey results defined
"strategic incivility" as "a more deliberate behavior on the part of uncivil
lawyers, including the misrepresentation or stretching the facts, playing
hardball, or indiscriminate or frivolous use of pleadings or motions.'>4s
Finally, an overwhelming majority of respondents agreed that
unprofessional and uncivil behavior "has a significant negative impact on
"[Ninety-four] percent of respondents strongly or
the practice." 4 "
somewhat agreed that unprofessional behavior makes resolving a matter
"[Ninety-one] percent [of respondents] strongly or
more difficult." 4
somewhat agree[d] that unprofessional behavior harms public [and] client
confidence in the judicial system." Finally, "[eighty-nine] percent of
respondents strongly or somewhat agree[d] that unprofessional behavior
leads to an increase in litigation/transaction costs." 4 9 These findings, and

many opinions written by trial and appellate courts across the country,
suggest that concerns about incivility are not exaggerated.so
Further, those who are skeptical about the frequency and aggregate
mass of reports of uncivil behavior in litigation should read the seminal,
40. Results of 2014 Survy on Professionalsm Released, 2CIVIuTY (May 28, 2015),
http://www.2civility.org/results-of-2014-survey-on-professionalism.
41. "Prejudicial behavior includes inappropriate comments about a lawyer based on race, age,
or gender." Id.
42. "Rudeness includes a sarcastic or condescending attitude, or belittling language." Id.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D 284, 290

(N.D. Tex. 1988) (emphasizing the importance of upholding ethical standards); In re Anonymous

Member of the S.C. Bar, 709 S.E.2d 633, 638 (S.C. 2011) (stating the civility oath is meant to protect
"the administration of justice and integrity of the lawyer-client relationship"); PNS Stores, Inc. v.

Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 276-77

(Tex. 2012) (highlighting the Texas Lawyer's Creed was

implemented due incivility concerns); see also Huggins v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 07-4917,

2009 WL 2973044, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2009) (acknowledging the limitations of ethical standards
while still emphasizing their importance); Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. Helix Health, LLC, No.

H-08-0337, 2008 WL 1883546, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2008) (mem. op.) (rebuking the attorneys
for a lack of civility).
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1988 Dondi Properties" opinion rendered by the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. 5 2 The court described the climate of litigation
that compelled them to spend an inordinate amount of time "refereeing
abusive litigation tactics that range from benign incivility to outright
obstruction."s 3 Further, the court observed:
As judges and former practitioners from varied backgrounds and levels of
experience, we judicially know that litigation is conducted today in a manner
far different from years past. Whether the increased size of the bar has
decreased collegiality, or the legal profession has become only a business, or
experienced lawyers have ceased to teach new lawyers the standards to be
observed, or because of other factors not readily categorized, we observe
patterns of behavior that forebode ill for our system of justice.5 4
V.

A.

CAN CIVIUTY BE ENFORCED?

The Dondi Dedsion

The next step is to determine whether civility can be enforced. While
some believe the vagueness of civility precludes enforcement, Dondi is
proof to the contrary.ss
The Dondi decision addresses conduct of counsel in two underlying
lawsuits. The first, which the court referred to as "Dondi Properties,"was a
suit brought to recover damages based upon "civil RICO, common law
and statutory fraud, the Texas Fraudulent Transfer Act, federal regulations
prohibiting
affiliate
transactions,
civil
conspiracy,
negligent
misrepresentation, and usury, arising in connection with activities related
The second
to the failed Vernon Savings and Loan Association."56
underlying lawsuit, referred to by the court as "KnghI' was an action for
"violations of the Texas Insurance Code and Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act, and for breach of duty of good faith
and breach of contract, arising from defendant's refusal to pay plaintiff the
51. Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
52. Id. at 292 (adopting standards of litigation conduct for attorneys appearing in civil actions in
the Northern District of Texas).
53. Id. at 286; see also Enoch, supra note 32, at 202 ("Perhaps our rules of conduct should be
drafted with the fundamentals of the adversary system in mind, eliminating what parties may do to
each other, and instead focusing on what must be done to advance one's own case. The courts have
tried to punish Rambo. It is now time to disarm him.").

54. Don&, 121 F.R.D at 286.
55. Id. at 287 (noting how the court can and will enforce civility in the courtroom per its
authority).

56. Id at 285.
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proceeds of a life insurance policy." 5 7
In the Dondi Propertiesaction, the defendants filed a motion for sanctions
against the plaintiffs for "failure to answer interrogatories, failure to
comply with prior orders of the court pertaining to discovery,
misrepresenting facts to the court, and improperly withholding
documents."" In Knight, the plaintiff filed a motion to "strike a reply brief
that the defendant filed without leave of court."" The plaintiff contended
the court should strike the reply brief "because defendant did not, as
required by Local Rule 5.1(f), obtain leave to file a reply, because
defendant failed to seek permission immediately upon receipt of plaintiffs
response, and, alternatively, because defendant's reply was filed in excess
of [twenty] days after plaintiff filed her response.""o The plaintiff also
requested leave to file an additional response in the event the court did not
strike the reply brief.6
In response to these two sets of motions and at the request of a
member of the court, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas convened en banc to craft a set of rules it enforces routinely to
compel civil conduct citing rules, statutes, and a professionalism creed that
espouses civility.6 2 Citing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
announced:
We are authorized to protect attorneys and litigants from practices that may
increase their expenses and burdens (Rules 26(b)(1) and 26(c)) or may cause
them annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression (Rule 26(c)), and to impose
sanctions upon parties or attorneys who violate the rules and orders of the
court (Rules 16(f) and 37).6
The court also cited federal statutes for its authority to compel civil
conduct: "We likewise have the power by statute to tax costs, expenses,
and attorney's fees to attorneys who unreasonably and vexatiously multiply
the proceedings in any case," 6 4 and "we are also granted the authority to
punish, as contempt of court, the misbehavior of court officers." 6
Finally, the court relied on its "inherent power to regulate the
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 286.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 287.
63. Id.
64. Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D 284, 287 (N.D. Tex.
1988) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012)).
65. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012)).
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administration of justice." 6 6
Further, the court announced that it would not tolerate uncivil behavior
and imposed new standards of conduct for practice in its district: the
Dallas Bar Association's Lawyer's Creed and Guidelines of Professional
Courtesy.6' The Dallas creed and guidelines-which expressly provide for
civil conduct 6 8-preceded the Texas Lawyer's Creed and remain part of
the fabric of the court's rules of conduct. Finally, the court made it clear:
We think the standards we now adopt are a necessary corollary to existing
law, and are appropriately established to signal our strong disapproval of
practices that have no place in our system of justice and to emphasize that a
lawyer's conduct, both with respect to the court and to other lawyers, should
at all times be characterized by honesty and fair play.6 9

B.

Other FederalCourts

Many federal districts in Texas have adopted rules similar to Dondi.' 0
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has also relied upon Dondi in recognizing a
district court's ability to sanction attorneys for uncivil conduct in
accordance with the rules, statutes, and the professionalism creed Dondi
cites. For example, in In re Elliott," the Fifth Circuit upheld a bankruptcy
court's imposition of attorney's fees as a sanction against an attorney based
upon a finding that the attorney acted solely for the purpose of "harassing

66. Id.
67. DALLAS BAR Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (2003), http://

www2.dallasbar.org/documents/DBA/o20ProfGLsCourtesy.pdf (last visited May 5, 2016).
68. Id. 1 1(a) ("Lawyers should treat each other, the opposing party, the court, and members of
the court staff with courtesy and civility and conduct themselves in a professional manner at all
times."); THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 2 ¶ II.

69. Dondi, 121 F.R.D at 288-89.
70. See In re Bradley, 495 B.R. 747, 783 n.22 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013) ("In 2001, the District
judges of the Southern District of Texas voted to adopt these Guidelines for Professional Conduct,
to be observed by all attorneys appearing before any district judge, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate
judge presiding in the Southern District of Texas. General Order 2001-7. The guidelines are derived

from the decision rendered in [Dond]."); In re Armstrong, 487 B.R. 764, 773 (E.D. Tex. 2012) ("The
implication that the Northern District encourages an attorney to advance claims the attorney knows
are baseless is especially ironic. The standards of conduct governing conduct in the Eastern District
of Texas, set out in Eastern District Local Rule AT-3, are those enumerated in [Donds]."); In re Mortg.

Analysis Portfolio Strategies, Inc., 221 B.R. 386, 389 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) ("Under Local Rule
1001(g) all counsel are to observe the standards of conduct set out in [Dond]."); see also

In re

Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 709 S.E.2d 636, 636-38 (S.C. 2011) (disciplining a lawyer for
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and violation of the lawyer's oath that includes

"civility").
71. In re Elliott, No. 93-1537, 1994 WL 24877 (5th Cir. 1994).
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opposing parties" and counsel.
Other federal courts have imposed sanctions for uncivil conduct
because such conduct frustrates orderly legal process. 73
A particularly
interesting example is found in the Huggins" case, where the Eastern
District Court of Pennsylvania considered sanctioning an attorney for
conduct during a deposition that became "heated, personal, rude, and
pointless."" During the deposition, plaintiffs counsel "threatened to
have an unlicensed paralegal assistant complete the deposition." 7 '
At
another point in the deposition, the defense counsel remarked "about the
skill of [opposing counsel's] mother in imparting proper manners to her
son."" The court noted that "[e]ventually after incessant insult exchanges
and aggressive questioning and objecting as documented in the deposition
transcript, defense counsel and the witness walked out of the
deposition."" In addressing this conduct, the court began its opinion by
stating:
When lawyers place a higher value on being heard than on being understood,
when they trample on civility, or when their supposed devotion to their
clients leads to stridency or worse, they undercut the belief in the law and in
the legal profession. At a minimum, uncivil, abrasive, abusive, hostile or
obstructive conduct by lawyers impedes the fundamental goal of resolving

72. Id. at *1 (citing Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 287-88).
73. Enumerating all such cases is beyond the scope of this Article. However a few are cited as

examples. See Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, 70 F. Supp. 2d 415, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("If every
lawyer and judge ... would analyze every action she or he takes in light of the goal of ensuring that
the system works fairly and efficiently for everyone, questions about professionalism would simply
disappear-and tremendous good would result for our community." (internal citation omitted));

Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 828 F. Supp. 594, 597 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (finding civility and
compliance with court orders to be "critical to the orderly processes" of the court); see also Wise v.

Wash. Cty., No. 10-1677, 2015 WL 1757730, at *34 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that "relentless
bickering and rancor made this litigation more onerous on the [clourt" and "the conduct of both

counsel multiplied the proceedings"); Alford v. Aaron Rents, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-683 MJR-DGW, 2010
WL 2765260, at *7 (S.D. Ill. May 17, 2010) ("The court cannot turn a blind eye to conduct that
negatively impacts its ability to promote the orderly administration of justice and resolve disputes
fairly.... Unless restrained, courts would spend endless hours and resources serving as a referee for
multiple discovery problems." (internal citations omitted)); Daniels v. Bursey, No. 03 C 1550, 2004
WL 1144046, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2004) ("Our system of justice does not work, or at least does
not work well, if lawyers act like professional wrestlers hyping the next match rather than as
members of the honorable profession to which they belong." (citations omitted)).

74.
2009).
75.
76.
77.
78.

Huggins v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 07-4917, 2009 WL 2973044 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16,
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *1.
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disputes rationally, peacefully, and efficiently. Because such conduct tends
to delay, and can even deny, justice, a presiding judge may be called upon to
determine whether one or more adversary has committed sanctionable
conduct. Events in this case present the Court with that unwelcome task.
In criticizing the behavior of both attorneys, the court cited the
proposed "Principles of Professionalism" published by the Philadelphia
Bar Association, which states that lawyers are to "[t]reat with civility
opposing counsel, lawyers and their staffs, witnesses and the courts and
court officers." 8 o The court denied the defendants' motion for sanctions:
"In determining the proper sanction for this misconduct, the [c]ourt
recognizes that requiring [plaintiffs counsel] and/or his client to pay the
costs and .fees [defendants] incurred in bringing the motion is not the most
appropriate one, especially given [defense counsel] was not an innocent
bystander in this debacle." 8" Instead, the court took a novel approach to
addressing the incivility exhibited by all attorneys involved:
[The c]ourt will deny the specific defense request for fees, in favor of a
sanction that the Court hopes will have greater long-term substantive effect.
The [c]ourt shall require [plaintiffs counsel] to attend a CLE course dealing
with civility and professionalism. Because this case has not yet concluded
and because defense counsel is not without blame for the embarrassing
conduct of the professionals here, inasmuch as the working relationship
between these opposing counsel will necessarily continue, the [c]ourt also
will expect [plaintiff and defense counsel] to join each other for an informal
meal in an effort to facilitate the repair of their professional
relationship. 8 2
As its authority for such a sanction, the court relied on its "inherent
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id. at *3 n.13 (citing PhiladelphiaBarAssonadion Prinn)pes of Pmfessionalism, PHILA. BAR As'N,

http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/PrinciplesOfProfessionalism?appNum=
2016).
81. Id. at *4.

(last visited May 5,

82. Id. at *2. The court cited Shakespeare when ordering the attorneys to join each other for a
meal:
Over 400 years ago, William Shakespeare apparently believed that that the legal profession
provided a useful example for achieving civility when, in The Taming ofthe Shrew, he wrote 'And
do as adversaries do in law, Strive mightily but eat and drink as friends.' At the end of the day,
it should not be merely intelligence, skepticism, oratorical flourish or the like that truly
distinguishes the legal profession from others. Rather, as Shakespeare recognized, one hopes
and expects that it also is civility. Perhaps the adversaries in this case can be reinspired to
achieve the Shakespearean vision and the aspirational goals of the very rules of professional
conduct by which counsel have pledged to abide.

Id. at *4 n.14.
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powers to control litigation pending before it, as well as the standards

articulated by Rule 30(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Rule 83.6.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for this District" to
sanction the attorney conduct.8 3
Additionally, the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of Florida
addressed incivility, labeling an attorney's behavior "deplorable" when he
scheduled depositions at Dunkin' Donuts against opposing counsel's
request, attended these depositions in a t-shirt and shorts, drew pictures of
male genitalia, and played the game "Angry Birds" during deposition
testimony." The court stated that the attorney's "course of conduct in
disparaging [opposing counsel], to [opposing counsel's] clients .. . severely
impacted these proceedings."" While no sanctions were imposed, the
86
court granted opposing counsel's motion to disqualify the attorney.
In another case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas strongly suggested a need for more civility between lawyers, even
where there may be no conduct amounting to an ethical violation.8 7 The
court's written opinion first addresses the issues raised on appeal, then
pointedly expresses concern about the lack of civility demonstrated by all
counsel in the case." The court observed that in their pleadings and
motions, "the parties have often forsaken cogent and well-researched
arguments for sarcastic and pejorative insults."" Then, the court listed
two specific examples of the insults from both sides contained in
pleadings, including when one counsel charged opposing counsel with
violations of federal criminal statutes that prohibit making false statements
to federal courts.9 o
Also, the court noted that in the defendants'
pleadings, they "comment on [the appellant's] 'penchant for filing or
threatening to file superfluous motions or pleadings' . . . [and] question the
Additionally, the parties exchanged
motives of plaintiffs counsel.""

83. Huggins v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 07-4917, 2009 WL 2973044, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 16, 2009).
84. See Bedoya v. Aventura Limousine & Transp. Serv., Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1370 (S.D.
Fla. 2012) (describing the uncivil actions of one particular attorney).

85. Id.
86. Id. at 1370, 1373 (noting the attorney's conduct was not "directly actionable" because the
"conduct occurred in another forum").

87. See Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. Healix Health, LLC, No. H-08-0337, 2008 WL
1883546, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2008) (reprimanding the parties for their conduct and
emphasizing its effect on the court).

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *12 n.45 (citing 18 U.S.C. §5 1001, 1623 (2012)).
Id.
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offensive e-mails that stated: "[Y]our client has issues with the truth" and
"[Y]ou are the obstacle in the case that's keeping it from getting resolved.
I'm sure Dr. Murphy appreciates having to pay for your antics." 9 2 To the
court, the e-mails between the parties' counsel were "emblematic of the
apparent disdain of both counsel for each other and the court" where they
contain accusations of "lacking an intention to comply with the rules and
of having a goal to bombard defendants and the court with unfounded
motions."" While not finding that either attorney had violated an ethical
duty, 94 the court directed "[c]ounsel for all parties ... to read and reflect
on the Creed . .. and conduct themselves accordingly." 9 s No sanctions

were imposed, but the court attached a copy of the Texas Lawyer's Creed
to its opinion, "admonish[ing] the parties and their counsel to treat one
another-and thus this court-with higher regard and with more civility
and courtesy."96

C.

Texas State Courts

While there are several Texas rules and statutes that address the
administration of cases and the general conduct of the lawyers, there is no
specific, enforceable requirement that lawyers conduct themselves in a
"civil" manner as in the federal courts in Texas or as found in some other
states.9' However, Texas rules and statutes do impose standards of justice
and fairness, which courts are required to enforce. Specifically, Rule 1 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states: "The proper objective of rules
of civil procedure is to obtain a just, fair, equitable[] and impartial
adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of
substantive law. To the end that this objective may be attained with as
great expedition and dispatch and at the least expense ...

9" In addition, Article

1.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled "Objects of this
Code," states:
This Code is intended to embrace rules applicable to the prevention and
prosecution of offenses against the laws of this State..

..

It seeks: . . . 3. To

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. (chastising counsel for their sarcastic comments).
95. Id. at *12.

96. Id.
97. See In re Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 709 S.E.2d 636, 636-38 (disciplining a lawyer
for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and violating the lawyer's oath that includes

civility).
98. TEx. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).
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5. To

Similarly, the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which
set out the minimum level of acceptable ethical conduct for lawyers,
address many of the same issues as to efficient court administration as
described in Rule 1 and Article 1.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal
For instance, lawyers are prohibited from causing
Procedure.
unreasonable delay in an action or unreasonably increasing costs.' 0 0
Likewise, the Texas Lawyer's Creed, although "aspirational," addresses
these issues. 1 0 ' Additionally, the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct are routinely cited by courts as guidelines for appropriate conduct
when considering questioned lawyer conduct. However, because those
rules are prohibited from use as a basis for civil claims or "procedural
weapons," Texas courts, as with federal courts, do not cite those rules as
grounds for sanctions-but, appropriately, cite them only as reference
points regarding parameters of lawyer behavior.' 0 2 For example, in Twist
v. McAllen National Bank,' the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
discussed a violation of Rule 3.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct when an attorney misrepresented case law to the
99. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.03 (emphasis added).

100. "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless the lawyer reasonably believes that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous." TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.01, rprinted in TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit.

G, app. A (West 2013) (TEX. STATE BAR. R. art. X, § 9). "[A] lawyer shall not take a position that
unreasonably increases the costs or other burdens of the case or unreasonably delays resolution of
the matter." Id. R. 3.02. "[A] lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than
to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the
rights of such a person." Id. R. 4.04.
101. The Texas Lawyer's Creed provides:
I will treat adverse parties and witnesses with fairness and due consideration. A client has no
right to demand that I abuse anyone or indulge in any offensive conduct. I will advise my client
that we will not pursue conduct which is intended primarily to harass or drain the financial
resources of the opposing party. I will advise my client that we will not pursue tactics which are
intended primarily for delay. I will advise my client that we will not pursue any course of action
which is without merit. I will advise my client that I reserve the right to determine whether to
grant accommodations to opposing counsel in all matters that do not adversely affect my
client's lawful objectives. A client has no right to instruct me to refuse reasonable requests
made by other counsel.
THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 2, ¶ 11.
102. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 15. Disciplinary rules are routinely

cited by courts as the guidelines for behavior, not for sanctions. See Twist v. McAllen Nat'l Bank,
248 S.W.3d 351, 364-68 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007, no pet.) (concluding the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct may be taken into account when determining sanctions).
103. Twist v. McAllen Nat'l Bank, 248 S.W.3d 351 (Tex: App.-Corpus Christi 2007, no pet.).
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court, imposing sanctions for this behavior and for bringing a groundless
mandamus petition, under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
52.11(a)). 10 4
The "Oath of Attorney" includes another important description of a
lawyer's responsibilities and requires the lawyer to state he will "honestly
demean" himself and he will conduct himself "with integrity and civility in
dealing and communicating with the court and all parties."' 0 5 While every
lawyer must recite that oath when sworn in as a member of the bar, the
"oath" stands alone without the support of a statue or rule that provides
for its enforcement.' 06
In PNS Stores v. Rivera,"o7 the Texas Supreme Court made it clear that
the Texas Lawyer's Creed is not a basis for a party or a lawyer to seek
sanctions.' 08 Further, as stated in the order promulgating the Creed,
"these standards are not a set of rules that lawyers can use and abuse to
-incite ancillary litigation or arguments over whether or not they have been
observed." However, the court also made it clear that although the Creed
is "aspirational," the law supports adherence to the principles, and
"[c]ompliance with the rules depends primarily upon understanding and
voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer pressure
and public opinion, and finally when necessary by enforcement by the
courts through their inherent powers and rules already in existence."'09

104. Id. at 364-68.
105. TEx. Gov CODE ANN. § 82.037(a) (West 2015).
106. Unlike Texas, South Carolina and Nevada have adopted rules that support the oath new
attorneys are required to take. As a result, violations of the attorney oath, including the clauses in the
oaths requiring civility, are violations of the rule, which allows the oath to be enforced and attorneys
to be sanctioned when their conduct fails to conform to the standards set forth by the oath. See In re

Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 709 S.E.2d 636, 636-38 ("To be admitted, the applicant must
pay a fee . . . and take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation" and reciting the South

Carolina "lawyer's oath." (citing S.C. APP. CT. R. 402(k))); see also NEv. S.C.R. 73 (2014) (stating
"[ulpon being admitted, each applicant shall take and subscribe to the following oath" and offering
the Nevada "attorney's oath'.

107. PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 2012).
108. See id. at 276-77 (holding the Creed "does not create new duties and obligations
enforceable by the courts").
109. THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 2; see

Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237, 239-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc) (discussing
the inherent powers of the court); Houtex Ready Mix Concrete & Materials v. Eagle Constr. & Envtl.

Servs., LP, 226 S.W.3d 514, 524 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) ("Inherent power to
sanction exists to the extent necessary to deter, alleviate, and counteract bad faith abuse of the

judicial process."); Kutch v. Del Mar Coll., 831 S.W.2d 506, 510 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992,
no writ) (stating a court's inherent power to impose sanctions is strongest when conduct complained
of interferes with "core functions" of the judiciary, i.e., hearing evidence, deciding issues of fact
raised by the pleadings, deciding questions of law, rendering final judgment, and enforcing that
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CONCLUSION

Unless the legal profession diligently cultivates an increase in civility and
professionalism, the legal system and those who use it will pay a significant
toll for lawyer incivility. The decision in Dondi Properiesv. Commerce Savings
& Loan Ass'n graphically portrays the degree to which incivility negatively
impacts the legal system.' 1 o Incivility wastes judicial resources and delays
justice."' Justice Sandra Day O'Connor sets a more positive tone for the
future when she addresses the incivility problem. She exhorts lawyers and
justices alike to effect an increase in the spirit of civility and
professionalism, writing, "More civility and greater professionalism can
only enhance the pleasure lawyers find in practice, increase the
effectiveness of our system of justice, and improve the public's perception
of lawyers." 1 1 2
In light of the described considerations, how then are Texas courts and
lawyers to assure civility in state courts? The answer is: we will re-commit
to our core values.
When the Creed says the standard is "My word is my bond,""' it is
clear that nothing short of respect for others and personal honesty is
acceptable. The disciplinary rules require candor and honesty as well.
Further, as described above, conduct detrimental to the administration of
justice is scorned by the disciplinary rules, the rules of procedure, other
statues, and the Creed. While Texas state courts will not impose sanctions
for violations of the tenets of the Creed, including the references to "civil"
conduct or the disciplinary rules, the courts are not disempowered. In
appropriate circumstances, the courts examine the conduct of lawyers,
compare that conduct to the standards in those disciplinary rules and in

judgment); see also Bill Whitehurst, A PlaintiffAttorney's Perspeedie, 57 TEX. B.J. 1099, 1100 (1994)
(referencing a court's inherent powers to enforce the Creed).
110. See Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D 284, 286 (N.D. Tex.
1988) ('We address today a problem that, though of relatively recent origin, is so pernicious that it
threatens to delay the administration of justice and to place litigation beyond the financial reach of
litigants. With alarming frequency, we find that valuable judicial and attorney time is consumed in
resolving unnecessary contention and sharp practices between lawyers.").
111. Id.
112. Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 5, 8 (1998).
113. THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 2,
T I(1).
114. TEx. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.03, reprented in TEx. Gov'T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2015) (TEX. STATE BAR. R. art. X, § 9) ("Candor Toward the
Tribunal'); id. R. 3.04 ("A lawyer shall not... (b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to
testify falsely ...
(d) knowingly disobey, or advise the client to disobey, an obligation under the
standing rules of or a ruling by a tribunal . . . ."), id R. 4.01 ("Truthfulness in Statements to Others").

242

ST. MARY'S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE &ETHIcs

[Vol. 6:222

the Creed, and determine appropriate sanctions-if any-under the
authority of procedural rules or statutes.' 15
No matter how one parses the term "civility," it means "respect." Most
lawyers are civil and respectful. However, disrespect and incivility can be
fairly and effectively addressed. As the Texas Supreme Court observed,
when necessary, all of the courts of our state have the tools to compel
compliance with the law and the tenants of the Creed."' If some lawyers
will not voluntarily comply with the Creed, and peer pressure and public
opinion have no effect upon them, then our courts may employ "their
inherent powers and rules already in existence. "117

115. See Twist v. McAllen Nat'l Bank, 248 S.W.3d 351, 364-68 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2007, no pet.) (citing the rule for sanctions found in TEX. R. APP. P. 52.11); see also TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.03 (stating a lawyer may not "make a false statement
of material fact or law to the tribunal"); Pine v. Deblieux, 405 S.W.3d 140, 150 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ("Trial courts also have inherent powers on which they may call to
administer justice and preserve their dignity and integrity. This power includes the ability to sanction
bad faith conduct that occurs during the course of litigation."' (quoting Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d

&

20, 51 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied))); Houtex Ready Mix Concrete
Materials v. Eagle Constr. & Envtl. Servs., LP, 226 S.W.3d 514, 524 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2006, no pet.) (noting a court's inherent power to sanction helps to prevent abuses of the judicial
process); Order of the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals, 62 Tex. B.J. 399,
400 (1999) (emphasizing a lawyer should not miscite record or authorities).
116. THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 2.

117. PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 276-77 (Tex. 2012).

